

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ATHENS 06502 271253Z

42

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 OC-05 A-01 CCO-00 ACDA-05 SAJ-01 /061 W

----- 099083

R 271123Z AUG 75 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 189

INFO USMISSION NATO

/SECDEF

JCS

USDEL MC

CINCUSNAVEUR

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

CINCUSAFE

CNO WASHDC

S E C R E T ATHENS 6502

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MILI, MARR, GR, US

SUBJECT: US-GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS: SOUDA BAY

REF: STATE 201659

1. TACTICS WE HAVE FOLLOWED ON SOUDA BAY IN US-GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY TWO CONSIDERATIONS: (A) OUR ASSUMPTION THAT THE GOG'S DECISION TO IMPOSE OPERATING RESTRICTIONS ON SOUDA WAS TAKEN AT POLITICAL LEVEL, PROBABLY BY CARAMANLIS HIMSELF, AND (B) ADVISABILITY OF AVOIDING BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF FACILITIES WHOSE NATO ASSOCIATION IS MANIFEST AND WHICH GOG MUST THEREFORE DISCUSS IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEST. WE HAVE BEEN KEENLY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSUADING GOG TO MODIFY OR REMOVE OPERATING RESTRICTIONS ON SOUDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT HAVE BELIEVED, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS WAS THROUGH APPROACHES TO GOG AT POLITICAL LEVEL AND OUTSIDE OF CONTEXT OF BASE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ATHENS 06502 271253Z

NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELEIVE THIS REASONING IS STILL VALID.

2. NEITHER GREEK SUBGROUP REPRESENTATIVES NOR GREEK PLENARY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IN A POSITION TO REMOVE OPERATING RESTRICTIONS TAKEN FOR ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL REASONS. TO INTRODUCE THE SUBJECT OF SOUDA INTO OUR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD, AT BEST, REGISTER US CONCERN AT THE WRONG LEVEL AND, AT WORST, ENCOURAGE THE GREEKS TO PUT A PRICE TAG ON SOUDA WHICH WOULD COMPLICATE OUR PROBLEMS UNNECESSARILY. REQUESTING GOG TO PARTICIPATE IN A SUBGROUP ON SOUDA PRIOR TO ROUND III WOULD, IF THE GREEKS AGREED, LEAD ALMOST INEVITABLY TO THE LATTER RESULT BECAUSE GREEK MEMBERS OF SUCH A SUBGROUP WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE EMPOWERED TO DISCUSS POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SOUDA PROBLEM AND WOULD THEREFORE ONLY BE PREPARED TO TEST OUR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO GAIN GREATER UTILIZATION OF THE FACILITY. WE WOULD, IN OTHER WORDS, PUT OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF OFFERING CONCESSIONS WITHOUT ANY ASSURANCES THAT OPERATING RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE REMOVED.

3. FOR THESE REASONS WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE REPEAT UNWISE TO SEEK FORMATION OF A SOUDA SUBGROUP AND THAT OUR BEST TACTIC CONTINUES TO BE TO EMPHASIZE IN PLENARY MEETINGS THE DISADVANTAGES BOTH TO THE US AND TO GREECE CREATED BY PRESENT OPERATING RESTRICTIONS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE SAME MESSAGE SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL ON EVERY APPROPRIATE OCCASION. WE HAVE DONE THIS IN CONVERSATIONS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER AVEROFF AND WITH THE HELLENIC HIGH COMMAND. THE CUMULATIVE FORCE OF THESE APPROACHES WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE UNDERCUT IF WE ENGAGED IN TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE SAME SUBJECT. SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD WEAKEN OUR ARGUMENT THAT US OPERATIONS AT SOUDA ARE IN GREEK AS WELL AS US INTERESTS AND WOULD ENABLE GREEK MINISTERS TO DEFLECT OUR APPROACHES BY POINTING OUT THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL UNTIL TECHNICAL TALKS WERE COMPLETED.

4. SHOULD WE REQUEST THE GREEKS TO PARTICIPATE IN A SOUDA SUBGROUP PRIOR TO ROUND III WE ARE INCLINED TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ATHENS 06502 271253Z

THINK THAT THEY WOULD ASK US WHAT ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM WE WISHED TO DISCUSS AND WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO "LISTEN TO US PROPOSALS" WITHOUT COMMITMENT ON THEIR OWN SIDE. SINCE SUCH A RESPONSE WOULD FORCE OUR HAND PREMATURELY, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR OVERALL STRATEGY WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY WAITING UNTIL GREECE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH NATO ARE FURTHER ADVANCED AND A THIRD BILATERAL ROUND HAS BEEN SCHEDULED BEFORE RAISING THE SUBJECT OF A SOUDA

SUBGROUP. MEANWHILE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THE
PROBLEM OF OPERATING RESTRICTIONS AT SOUDA ON THE POLITICAL
LEVEL AT EVERY SUITABLE OCCASIONS.
KUBISCH

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY BASES, NEGOTIATIONS, SOUDA BAY
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975ATHENS06502
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750296-1053
From: ATHENS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750811/aaaaajcz.tel
Line Count: 119
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 STATE 201659
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 JUN 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <09 OCT 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ECT: US-GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS: SOUDA BAY
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, MARR, GR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006